Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1961

Agnes Lundberg v. Le Grand P. Backman : Brief of
Respondent in Opposition to Appellant's Petition
for Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Milton V. Backman; Attorney for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Lundberg v. Backman, No. 9212 (Utah Supreme Court, 1961).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3609

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREIVIE COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

AGNES LUNDBERG,

FILED
l1 PR r: .
•

I

~J--

19o,-~ 1

. PlaintiII and A ppellrmt-;---c- --;_- . _.. _________________ _
r...

Supreme

Co~ri:---Ut~-h··-~

Case

vs.

No. 9212

LEGRAND BACKMAN,
Defendant and Respondent,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO APPELLANT'S
PETITION FOR REHEARING.

Milton V. Backman
Attorney for Respondent,
1111 Deseret Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
Argument ________ -_______________________________________________________________ I

<:<>nclt~si<>n ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the

STATE OF UTAH

AGNES LUNDBERG,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case

vs.

No. 9212

LEGRAND BACKMAN,
Defendant and Respondent,

Appellant in her petition for rehearing and brief in
support thereof says the court has erred in sustaining the order
of the lower court in it's granting a summary judgment in
favor of respondent an~ against appellant, this because as ap#1 eYe
1..5 •
•
pe11 ant conten d sAa
genuine
Issue
of f act as to wh eth er or not
respondent had terminated the relationship of attorney and
client. It is evident however, that a trial would not produce
evidence which is not already before the court as to such issue.
We cannot understand how a termination of a relationship
which is not even asserted to have been established could come
about unless the law (not facts) establishes such relationship.
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In this case appellant has at no time either in her pleading or in her affidavits either alleged or contended that there
was ever an agreement between appellant and respondent
under which respondent would represent appellant beyond
the trial of the case in the lower court. Therefore if there
was an obligation as is contended by appellant it would be because the law imposes that obligation on respondent if this
was the law. But this court has held that there is no obligation
for an attorney to carry on defendant's case beyond the final
judgment without an agreement to do so. Appellant further
contends that the issue is not whether respondent was employed to appeal appellant's case but the issue is whether respondent violated his obligation as an attorney in exercising care in
the performance of his duties. This too is a question of law
which the court must determine from the facts before it, the
pleadings and affidavits. We cannot see how without appellant having pleaded that such obligation existed she could
produce evidence to prove that which appellant has not pleaded.
Counsel for appellant argues that not once did respondent
ever advise appellant that he considered their relationship
terminated. That statement is not true and the record will
not bear out such statement. The record shows that appellant
in her own affidavit stated that she contacted attorney John
H. Stone of this city who advised her he was unable to perfect
an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court until respondent executed and filed a withdrawal from the case; that appellant
contacted respondent and was advised by him that he ha4
withdrawn and this information was again relayed to Mr.
Stone.
It is to be noted that appellant does not say that she was
advised the respodent would withdraw but that he had with-
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drawn. Again respondent in his deposition testified that
within a few days after the trial of the case out of which this
action arose he told appellant he would not serve her any more
because of the attitude appellant had taken. toward respondent.

Justice Crockett in his dissenting opinion states that the
evidence which the court must presume is that respondent did
not make it known to appellant that he would not represent
appellant in proceedings subsequent to the entry of judgment.
It is most difficult to follow the reasoning of Justice Crockett
when appellant admits that she was advised that respondent
had withdrawn from the case. And again as Justice Crockett
quotes from appellant's second affidavit it is evident that
appellant was told by respondent that he had withdrawn from
the case. True appellant goes on and avers that Mr. Backman had not in fact done so, but that does not make a contradiction or a dispute when appellant admits she was told
respondent had withdrawn. We contend that in summary judgment proceedings the parties are bound by their ad~issions.
Then too it is evident from appellant's affidavit that appellant not only had time to perfect an appeal, but did contact
ot}l~r cou~sel rf:?garding an appeal within the appeal period
all of which goes. to show that appellant knew that respondent
would not represent appellant after the case had been decided
in the lower court.
Justice Crockett says respondent filed a motion for a new
trial on appellant's behalf which was filed too late; and did
the same thing with respect to the filing of a belated notice
of appeal on her behalf. No notice of appeal was ever filed
by respondent.
It seems from Justice Crockett's dissenting opinion that
because both appellant and respondent thought the lower court
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erred in it's decision, some duty rested upon respondent to
follow the case through even though there was no allegation
of an agreement. It is not unusual, but on the contrary usual
for attorneys in losing a case to not agree with the court and
to conclude that the court erred.
The only thing shown in this case is that respondent
did without any obligation on his part file a motion for
new trial after the time had expired but before the appeal period had expired, and respondent filed a withdrawal,
which was not required under our rules, after the appeal
period had expired. Appellant could not have been misled
by respondent's having filed a belated motion for new trial
because she avers that she had no knowledge of respondent's having filed the same.
Because other counsel told appellant they could not
represent her until respondent filed a formal withdrawal
when that was not the law, does not give rise to an action on
behalf of appellant against respondent.

CONCLUSION
There is no genuine issue for a court or jury to decide
in this case and respondent should not be pl~ced in the
embarrassing position in which he would find himself if
compelled to defend such a case at a trial and especially
risk a decision by a jury where there is no more evidence of
a cause of action than is shown in this case.
Respectfully submitted,

M. V. BACKMAN,
Attorney for respondent
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